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Insuring Investment and Loans Against
Currency Inconvertibility, Expropriation,
and Political Violence*
By ROBERT B. SHANKS
A.B. Brown University 1972; JD. University of Virginia 1975; Vice-President
and General Counsel of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The
views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily represent
those of the Corporation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of insuring against political risk is nothing new. It dates
back at least to the time when Englishmen sat around the table at the
Lloyds coffee house in London, betting whether British merchant ships
would slip past the guns of England's maritime rivals. Many bankers
would say, with some justification, that banks have been insuring polit-
ical risks for centuries and are, in fact, the ultimate political risk insurers.
The notion of carving out political risks, treating them separately from
other risks, and insuring against them is, however, of more recent
vintage.
The use of political risk investment insurance by the United States
Government to encourage private investment in foreign countries dates
back to the 1948 Marshall Plan, when limited investment guarantees
were offered to encourage private American companies to invest in war-
ravaged Europe.' The program guaranteed only that currency the inves-
tor received as income from his or her investment could be converted
into United States dollars.2 By the late 1950s, Congress had directed the
* This commentary is based on a speech given at Hastings College of Law at a
symposium on Political Risk Management. The author wishes to thank Ms. Patricia A. Herb,
a law student at the Georgetown University Law Center and an intern in Overseas Private
Investment Corporation's Office of the General Counsel, for her diligent efforts to convert the
original speech into this commentary. Any substantive errors, however, are entirely
attributable to the author.
1. Economic Cooperation Act, § 11l(b)(3), 62 Stat. 144 (1948). For a more complete
discussion of the background of the OPIC program, see Franklin & West, The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1978: A Reaffirmation of the Developmental Role
of Investment Insurance, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1 (1979).
2. Congress extended the convertibility guarantee. Some members of Congress believed
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program away from Western Europe and toward its present purpose of
promoting United States private investment in friendly developing coun-
tries.3 The scope of the insurance coverage was expanded to include the
major political risks that concerned members of the business community
investing abroad in the less developed countries (LDCs): expropriation,
transfer risks, and risks associated with political violence.4
By the 1960s, other major industrial countries had begun to offer
similar incentives to their nationals to encourage investment in LDCs.5
Also during the 1960s, Congress authorized additional investment incen-
tives, such as project financing and preinvestment survey grants, to stim-
ulate further United States investor interest in the developing world.6
This program was run by the Agency for International Development
(AID), but AID was not well equipped to handle the increasing volume
of applications during the 1960s.7 The difficulties incurred in administer-
ing the program led to a search for a better administrative structure. In
1968, a Presidential advisory committee concluded that an independent
agency with a corporate structure and a mixed public-private board of
directors would provide an appropriate balance of managerial flexibility
and policy control.' This recommendation and growing investor com-
that the desire of American businesses to expand abroad was thwarted by their inability to
transfer foreign currency into United States dollars. See H.R. REP. No. 1585, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1948); Franklin & West, supra note 1, at 2-5.
3. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS, S. REP. No. 612, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1961); MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITrING RECOMMENDATIONS RELATIVE TO A MUTUAL SE-
CURITY PROGRAM, H.R. Doc. No. 144, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955). The catalyst for chang-
ing the direction of the program to the developing world was President Truman's Point Four
Address to Congress in 1950. Truman explained that the communist threat necessitated a
program to assist and accelerate the development of economically underdeveloped areas of the
world, a task which could be assisted by foreign direct investment. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PUB. No. 3719, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS, POINT 4: COOPERA-
TIVE PROGRAMS FOR AID IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMICALLY UNDERDEVELOPED
AREAS 97 (1950).
4. MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1954, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS ON H.R. 9678, H.R. REP. No. 1925, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 89; MUTUAL SECUR-
ITY ACT OF 1956, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON H.R. 11356, H.R.
REP. No. 2213, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 34, 67; MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1959,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON H.R. 7500, H.R. REP No. 440, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 413(b)(4)(B)(ii), at 84-88.
5. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INVESTMENT
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (5th ed. 1983).
6. Act for International Development, ch. 2, 75 Stat. 430 (1961) (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1982)).
7. See Hornbostel, Investment Guaranties: Bureaucracy Clogs the Flow, 4 COLUM. J.
WORLD BUS. 37 (1969).
8. INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, THE CASE FOR A U.S.
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plaints about the bureaucratic inertia of dealing with AID led to the for-
mation of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in 1969
as an independent government agency in corporate form. The new
agency opened for business in 1971.'
Soon after OPIC opened its doors in 1971, it was drawn into the
brewing controversy over the role of multinational corporations in the
developing world."0 OPIC had inherited AID's portfolio, with approxi-
mately twenty-five percent of its total exposure located in Allende's
Chile. When Allende came to power, Chile promptly commenced the
expropriation of several AID-insured United States investments. These
nationalizations resulted in claims against OPIC in excess of $360 mil-
lion, including claims by the Anaconda Company for $154 million and
by International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) for $95 million." It
appeared at the time that, if these claims were proved valid, OPIC would
not have the necessary reserves on hand to cover its exposure and would
have to seek additional appropriations from Congress.12
These developments led to a hard-fought Congressional reassess-
ment of the need for OPIC-a battle that OPIC barely survived. The
debate centered on three questions: (1) the extent to which OPIC con-
tributed to the development assistance objectives of the United States, (2)
OPIC's financial condition, and (3) whether OPIC's insurance of United
States investors increased the likelihood of conflicts between the United
States and host countries by politicizing investment disputes.' 3 Rather
OVERSEAS PRIVATE ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION: A PROPOSAL (1968), cited
in Franklin & West, supra note 1, at 5. See also Griffin, Transfer of OPIC's Investment Insur-
ance to Private Insurers: Prospects and Proposals, 7 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 631, 634 (1976).
9. Franklin & West, supra note 1, at 5. Senator Jacob Javits had long favored an invest-
ment guaranty program which was handled privately. Javits proposed the establishment of a
"Peace by Investment Corporation," which would begin as a public corporation, but govern-
ment participation would be phased out over time. 111 CONG. REC. 13,513-17 (1965). Secre-
tary of State William P. Rogers told Congress that the new program would "focus more
sharply than ever on stimulating private enterprise" to invest in less developed countries and
that the establishment of OPIC was necessary "in order to carry out this purpose in the most
efficient and businesslike fashion." Hearings on S. 2347 before the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1969). OPIC's enabling statute, Title IV of Part I of the Foreign
Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 234(c), 235(b), 236 (1982), articulates the purpose intended for
OPIC: "to mobilize and facilitate the participation of United States private capital and skills
in the economic and social progress of less developed friendly countries and areas, thereby
complimenting the development assistance objectives of the United States .... " Id. § 231.
10. Griffin, supra note 8, at 637. See also Gilbert, Expropriations and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, 9 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 515 (1977).
11. Id. at 539.
12. Id. at 516.
13. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT COR-
PORATIONS AMENDMENT ACT, S. REP. No. 676, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1973), reprinted in
1986]
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than kill the program, however, Congress extended OPIC's authority
under the condition that OPIC endeavor to transfer its insurance under-
writing to the private sector by 1981.14
Between 1974 and 1976, OPIC settled its Chilean claims.15 With
these settlements concern over OPIC's financial condition subsided.
OPIC also began an ambitious program to encourage private sector in-
surers to offer coverage for political risks. By the end of 1976, however,
it had become clear that OPIC would not be able to transfer its insurance
program to the private sector on the schedule set forth in the 1974
amendments and that continued efforts to do so would simply undermine
OPIC's effectiveness.1 6 The private market was simply unwilling to as-
sume political risks on anything like the terms and conditions available
under OPIC's programs. Moreover, United States investment in the
LDCs appeared to be declining during a period of increased need for
such investment, while national interest in the diversification of supply
sources for critical raw materials increased substantially.7 These devel-
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 517 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 676]. A more plausible
conclusion, adopted by a minority of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), was
that OPIC insurance tends to depoliticize investment disputes by providing a vehicle for their
resolution at a technical level before they are raised to a political level by the operation of the
Hickenlooper, Gonzales, and Brook amendments. These amendments require that the United
States Government take certain punitive actions against countries that expropriate properties
of United States citizens. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982) (Hick-
enlooper Ammendment); International Development Association Act, 22 U.S.C. § 284(j)
(1982) (Gonzales Ammendment); Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(i) (1982) (Brook
Ammendment).
14. S. REP. No. 676, supra note 13, at 37.
15. See H.R. REP. No. 670, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 102 [hereinafter 1977 H.R. REP.]; see also OPIC Authorization:
Hearings on S. 1771 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Senate Hearings].
16. The Executive Branch review, studies by the American Bar Association, the General
Accounting Office (GAO), and the private insurance industry all agreed that the 1974 "priva-
tization" mandate would not work. See 1977 H.R. REP., supra note 15, at 15; 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra note 15, at 13, 26. The SFRC further concluded that "lifting the requirement
for privatization by a certain date will free OPIC manpower and resources for more innovative
efforts in project identification and development." Id. at 25. See also 1977 H.R. REP., supra
note 15, at 37 (statement of Rutherford Poats), 104 (statement of Fred Bergsten), 161 (state-
ment of Joseph Griffin, spokesman for the American Bar Association), 195 (statement of Le-
roy Simon, senior vice-president, Prudential Insurance Company), 247 (statement of J.
Kenneth Fasick, GAO spokesman), 241 (statement of Marshall T. Mays, former President of
OPIC, who testified that it was too early to abandon the privatization experiment); Griffin,
supra note 8, at 631, 657-99 (reprinting the transcript of an April 21, 1976 discussion, "New
Developments in Insuring Overseas Investments Against Political Risks," sponsored in Wash-
ington, D.C., by the American Bar Association Subcommittee on Insuring Overseas
Investment).
17. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 20 (statement of Rutherford Poats).
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opments led to an extensive examination early in the Carter Administra-
tion of OPIC's functions and policy. The cabinet level Economic Policy
Group found that OPIC programs significantly contributed to the imple-
mentation of United States foreign economic development policies and
recommended that OPIC be continued.' 8 This view in effect has been
Congressionally ratified by OPIC's 1978, 1981 and 1985
reauthorizations.
II. OPIC PROGRAMS
OPIC's mission, as defined in the Foreign Assistance Act,19 is to
"mobilize and facilitate the participation of United States private capital
and skills in the economic and social development of less developed
friendly countries and areas, thereby complementing the development
assistance objectives of the United States .... ,0 OPIC accomplishes
this mission by encouraging interested private investors to invest in de-
veloping countries. Obviously OPIC cannot create investors willing to
invest in the poorest and riskiest countries in the world. The program is
market-driven; it is dependent upon the existence and investors' percep-
tions of commercially viable opportunities for investments in developing
countries. It cannot create opportunities where none exist. The program
seeks to equalize some of the costs and risks of doing business in develop-
ing countries with those of doing business in the more developed coun-
tries and, thereby, seeks to encourage selected United States private
investment in countries where perceived political risks otherwise might
appear prohibitive.2' For almost forty years now, this program has
proved that reasonably priced, comprehensive insurance against the ma-
jor political risks associated with investing abroad can be an effective,
low-cost public policy tool that can encourage a significantly increased
flow of private investment to selected countries.22
OPIC operates two basic programs. The first, and by far the largest,
is OPIC's political risk insurance program, which covers the political
risks of expropriation or confiscation; currency inconvertibility, or trans-
fer risk; and various kinds of risks associated with political violence.
18. Id. at 12, 15, 20.
19. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1982).
20. Id.
21. See Extension and Revision of OPICPrograns, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (statement of Rutherford Poats), 99 (statement of C. Fred
Bergsten), 222 (statement of Prof. Stephen J. Kobrin, Sloan School of Management, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology), cited in Franklin & West, supra note 1, at 6.
22. Id.
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This Article focuses on the insurance program because it is by far the
larger of the two, but it is important to note that OPIC also has a finance
program. In effect, OPIC is a bank as well as an insurance company.
Under its finance program OPIC can participate as a medium to
long-term project lender. For smaller projects, involving small busi-
nesses, OPIC can participate as a direct lender. For larger projects, and
larger investors, OPIC can faciliate commercial lending by providing in-
vestment guarantees for commercial bank loans.z3 In this sense, OPIC
functions much like the International Finance Corporation under the
World Bank. While the OPIC finance program is a very important com-
ponent of OPIC and is worthy of an article in itself, it is beyond the scope
of this Article, which will focus on OPIC's political insurance program.
It should be noted that, as a lender or guarantor, OPIC assumes both
commercial and political risks. As an insurer, however, its coverage is
limited to political risks.
A. OPIC's Political Risk Insurance Program
OPIC's political risk insurance program covers the major political
risks associated with investing abroad.
1. Expropriation
Expropriation is a deliberate act by a host government to deprive an
investor of the value or the control of his or her investment.24 It is essen-
23. OPIC, INVESTMENT FINANCE HANDBOOK (1985).
24. Article IV of OPIC's standard contract (Form 234 KGT 12-85) defines "expropria-
tion" as the following:
4.01 Total Expropriation. Compensation is payable for total expropriation (§ 5.01),
subject to the exclusion (§ 4.03) and limitations (§ 5.04), if an act or series of acts
satisfies all of the following requirements:
(a) the acts are attributable to a foreign governing authority which is in defacto
control of the part of the country in which the project is located;
(b) the acts are violations of international law (without regard to the availability
of local remedies) or material breaches of local law;
(c) the acts directly deprive the Investor of fundamental rights in the insured
investment (Rights are "fundamental" if without them the Investor is substan-
tially deprived of the benefits of the investment.); and
(d) the violations of law are not remedied (§ 9.01.9) and the expropriatory effect
continues for one year.
4.02 Expropriation of Funds. Compensation is payable for an expropriation of funds
that constitutes a return of the insured investment or earnings on the insured invest-
ment (§ 5.02) if an act or series of acts (a) satisfies the governmental action, illegality
and duration requirements (§ 4.01(a), (b), and (d)); and
(b) directly results in preventing the Investor from
(1) repatriating the funds; and
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tially a "taking" by a foreign government. Obviously, a nationalization
or taking is a sovereign act. It is legal under international law if: (1) it is
for a public purpose, (2) it is not discriminatory, (3) it is not accompa-
nied by a "denial of justice"-in other words, it is accomplished accord-
ing to legal procedures, including a right to contest the action-and (4) it
is accompanied by "prompt, adequate and effective compensation."25
This last phrase is a reference to the so-called "Hull Doctrine,"
which remains the official United States position on the compensation
requirement under international law for nationalizations. This standard
is controversial with some developing countries and has often been chal-
lenged,26 most recently in the Iranian claims cases before arbitrators in
the Hague.27 The Iranians had argued that the correct standard was
"appropriate" compensation, a standard under which the value of an in-
vestment could be offset by such factors as "excess profits" earned by the
venture, perceived damage to the host country, and various other kinds
of epistemological notions.28 They further argued that evidence of past
settlements should be permitted to prove the value of investments.29 For
the most part, the arbitrators in the Hague have not been persuaded by
these arguments.3 °
Perhaps equally important, the American Law Institute has recently
redrafted § 712 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
(2) effectively controlling the funds in the country in which the project is
located.
25. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712(1)-(2)(Re-
vised, 1986) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]. The quoted phrase refers to the Hull
Doctrine, first articulated in 1938 by Secretary of State Hull in an exchange with the Minister
of Foreign Relations of Mexico. Secretary Hull argued that the property of aliens was pro-
tected by an international standard under which expropriation must be accompanied by "ade-
quate, effective, and prompt payment" to the foreign national. 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-61 (1942).
26. See Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic (1977), 20 I.L.M. 1, 86 (1985)
(arbitrator applied measure of "equitable compensation," using "prompt, adequate and effec-
tive compensation" as maximum standard of relief); Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co.
(1982), 20 I.L.M. 976, 1033 (1982) (arbitrator applied "appropriate compensation" standard,
considering all the circumstances).
27. Compare American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran (1983), 23
I.L.M. 1, 8-12 (1984) ("value of the property taken" standard of relief applied) with concurring
opinions of the United States judges, id. at 14 (calling for application of "just compensation"
standard cited in Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the
United States of America and Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 900, T.I.A.S. No. 3853).
28. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712, VII (2), supra note 25, at 523 (citing American
International Group, 23 I.L.M. at 8-12).
29. American International Group, 23 I.L.M. 1.
30. Id.; Starrett Housing Corp v. Islamic Republic of Iran (1983), 23 I.L.M. 1090, 1117
(1984).
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United States, which deals with this issue.3 Early drafts of the law com-
promised the Hull standard by stating that "just compensation" ordina-
rily would be equal to the value of the investment. By implication, "just
compensation" would not be equal to the value of the investment in some
circumstances. Moreover, the accompanying comments raised questions
concerning not only the compensation requirement, but also the defini-
tion of so-called "creeping expropriation" by injecting a notion of intent
into the definition. In other words, the comments raised the possibility
that the party seeking compensation for an expropriation might have to
prove that the government had intended to expropriate. This standard
would be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to meet in the context of a
"creeping expropriation" case. For this reason, OPIC was keenly inter-
ested in § 712, and commented extensively to the American Law Insti-
tute (ALI) on the early drafts. Publication of the final version is expected
in the near future.
Initially, expropriation coverage was OPIC's hottest-selling item.
There have been, however, relatively few expropriation claims in recent
years, with the notable exception of the claims which arose from the Ira-
nian Revolution. Even fewer of the more recent expropriation claims are
for outright nationalizations. Instead, the more recent claims tend to be
for "creeping expropriation," or expropriation through a series of acts
that individually might be seen as administrative measures or general,
health, safety, or welfare measures undertaken by the host government3 2
This trend appears attributable to at least three factors. First, the
majority of LDC governments are busy competing with each other to
attract foreign investment and are reluctant to take any actions that
would raise concerns about the climate for foreign investment in their
countries. Second, LDC governments have become much more sophisti-
cated and are aware that many tools are available to accomplish their
political or economic objectives short of outright nationalization. Out-
right nationalization can have undesirable repercussions for a govern-
ment's standing in the international financial system. Third,
international transactions have become increasingly complex and varied.
International investments no longer consist primarily of consignment
agreements with host governments for extraction of minerals or other
resources. Rather, today's international investors tend to form many dif-
31. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 25.
32. The term "de facto expropriation" perhaps more accurately describes this form of
nationalization than the more colloquial term "creeping expropriation," which has gained
wide usage.
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ferent and complex kinds of cooperative relationships with host govern-
ments, parastatal entities, or private host country nationals.
In contrast to overt nationalization, de facto, or creeping, expropria-
tion can be very difficult to recognize. Basically, de facto or creeping
expropriation can be defined as any act, or series of acts, for which the
state is responsible, which are illegal under domestic or international law,
and which have a substantial enough adverse effect on either the enter-
prise or the investor's rights under the enterprise."3
The obvious question posed by this definition is, how much is "sub-
stantial enough?" A broad range of governmental acts-moving along a
spectrum from fairly direct forms of intervention to various subtle forms
of interference-have confronted OPIC. In reviewing a claim, OPIC
must consider what has happened and its effect on the entire investment.
Under its insurance policies, OPIC is sometimes able to avoid this diffi-
cult question of precisely how much interference is enough because its
standard contract does not permit claims for partial expropriation or di-
minished value of an investment due to some element of creeping expro-
priation.3 4 An investor must be willing to give up his or her investment
entirely.3" In other words, OPIC attempts to let the investor decide, at
least initially, how much interference is substantial enough.
A hypothetical example, based on an actual situation, may help il-
lustrate the difficulty of deciding precisely at what point an expropriation
has taken place. OPIC insured a joint venture to catch, process, and
freeze seafood for export. Forty-nine percent of the equity was held by a
United States investor, with local nationals holding the remaining fifty-
one percent. OPIC officers thought that this structure was an advantage
at the time of the investment because the local investors were well-con-
nected with the government and therefore could be helpful in acquiring
the necessary government approvals, licenses, and permits. A military
coup occurred, however, and the new government was hostile both to the
American investors and to the local partners, precisely because the
Americans and the local investors had been close to the former govern-
33. See generally Weston, "Constructive Takings" Under International Law: A Modest
Foray into the Problem of "Creeping Expropriation," 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1975); Vagts,
Coercion and Foreign Investment Arrangements, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 17 (1978). OPIC's en-
abling legislation defines expropriation as "any abrogation, repudiation, or impairment by a
foreign government of its own contract with an investor.., where such abrogation, repudia-
tion, or impairment is not caused by the investor's own fault or misconduct, and materially
adversely affects the continued operation of the project." 22 U.S.C. § 2198(b) (1982).
34. OPIC Form Contract 234 KGT 12-85 ("plain language contract"), arts. IV, V, re-
printed in 51 Fed. Reg. 17,3438 (1986).
35. Id.
1986]
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ment. The government then began a series of acts, some of which could
be characterized as regulatory measures, which had the effect of increas-
ingly restricting the investment. First, the expatriate manager and his
family were threatened with physical harm; they packed up and left.
Second, an expatriate refrigeration expert, whose services were vital, was
denied the right to extend his visa; he was forced to leave. Third, govern-
ment authorities interfered with the joint venture's fishing rights.
Fourth, harbor authorities refused to allow ships dealing with the joint
venture to use port facilities, and it became very difficult to export. Fi-
nally, when the investor had been reduced to flying out a single load of
seafood per day on a small company plane, the government refused to
permit the joint venture to fly its plane unless it was accompanied by a
government-approved pilot and "seafood inspector." This extra passen-
ger on the light plane had the effect of displacing his weight in seafood.
This requirement created a serious problem because the person chosen
weighed approximately 400 pounds and, apparently, had been selected
because he was the heaviest member of the armed forces. Moreover, as a
"pilot," he had a record of having crashed several airplanes. In any case,
the investor filed a claim, and OPIC paid it.
Obviously, this is a fairly extreme example, but it illustrates the diffi-
culty in determining precisely when an expropriation has taken place and
the difficulty of proving, at any point along a continuum of interferences,
that the government intends to expropriate, rather than simply to regu-
late, the investment.
2. Inconvertibility Coverage
OPIC can insure the right to convert local currency into dollars.
Convertibility into dollars is necessary in order to remit dividends or
profits, to repay dollar-denominated loans, and to meet other hard cur-
rency obligations. Under this form of coverage, OPIC essentially insures
an existing legal right to convert. The procedure for converting currency
varies somewhat from country to country. Where there is no legal right
to convert, as in China, OPIC is not able to offer this form of coverage.
Given a legal right to convert, however, OPIC can insure that right
against a denial or adverse change either through active blockage, where
the government changes the rules or refuses to honor a request to con-
vert, or through passive blockage, where the investor goes through the
prescribed procedures, yet cannot convert the earnings.36 After a claim
is ripe and there has been no payment for the time prescribed in the
36. Id. arts. II, III.
[Vol. 9
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policy,37 OPIC "buys" the local currency for dollars at the prevailing
rate and "sells" it to the United States embassy in the country for local
operating expenses. The embassy then credits OPIC's account.3 8 This
arrangement effectively allows OPIC to circumvent the host country's
central banking system and convert currency when the central bank will
not, or cannot, convert it.
It should be emphasized that this form of coverage insures against
inconvertibility, not devaluation.3 9 OPIC buys and sells currency at the
prevailing rates. It bears the devaluation risk only from the time it ac-
quires the currency until it disposes of it through the United States em-
bassy. Because OPIC has this ability to dispose of currency throughout
United States Government channels, its salvage rate is very high for this
kind of coverage. There are occasions, however, when this mechanism
does not work smoothly, perhaps because diplomatic relations have been
severed, or because it is not possible to use currency quickly enough to
avoid a devaluation loss. In such situations, OPIC has the authority to
arrange for swaps on commercial terms." This substitute is, however,
less than satisfactory, as such swaps usually entail disposal of the local
currency at a significant discount and payment of substantial
commissions.
Not surprisingly, given the current Third World debt crisis, incon-
vertibility is currently OPIC's most sought-after form of coverage and
the one that produces the most claims.4 Despite OPIC's unique salvage
ability, it is simply too risky to offer this form of coverage in some coun-
tries. Even in countries that are experiencing, or can be expected to ex-
perience, severe liquidity problems, however, it may be possible to use
commercial devices (such as offshore accounts) or underwriting tools
(such as caps on the maximum amount that can be presented for conver-
37. Id.
38. In this way, OPIC has recovered, or anticipates recovery of, 94% of the amount it
paid out in inconvertibility claims during fiscal 1985. OPIC, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1986)
[hereinafter OPIC ANNUAL REPORT] ($15,751,369 anticipated recovery, $16,819,131 paid
out).
39. OPIC Form Contract 234 KGT 12-85, supra note 34, art. II. Devaluation is consid-
ered a commercial risk. See A. FATouRoS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN IN-
vESTons 103 (1962) (OPIC insurance covers "only nonbusiness risks and not those normally
associated with business ventures, such as devaluation"); but see M. NEUMANN, THE UNITED
STATES INVESTMENT GUARANTY PROGRAM AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 65 (1959)
(devaluation seems to be a political risk appropriate for public guaranty coverage).
40. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 234(c), 235(b), 236 (1982); see also Mutual Se-
curity Act of 1954 68 Stat. 832 (1954) (as amended by the proposed Mutual Security Act of
1959, 73 Stat. 246 (1959) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1925 and repealed).
41. During fiscal year 1985, OPIC settled 22 inconvertibility claims totalling $16,819,131.
OPIC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 23.
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sion in any given year). Through such devices, some unacceptable risks
can be converted into insurable ones.
3. Political Violence
The term "political violence" is a euphemism for various kinds of
risks associated with wars, revolutions, insurrections, civil strife, and ter-
rorism. Unlike expropriation or inconvertibility coverage, this risk is
generally outside the control of the host government. By the same token,
in the event of a claim the prospects for salvage are much weaker for this
kind of coverage than for either expropriation or inconvertibility claims.
One cannot pursue one's subrogation rights against host governments
that cannot control insurgent violence. Consequently, for political vio-
lence coverage OPIC assesses risk on a somewhat different basis. OPIC
does not significantly vary its rates from one country to another for ex-
propriation or inconvertibility insurance, despite the fact that stability
may differ from one government to another.42 This is partly because
OPIC is an incentive program, and partly because its policies typically
extend for as long as twenty years. OPIC cannot predict what will hap-
pen in any country over such a long period of time, so it controls its
exposure in other ways, using such underwriting tools as limiting total
exposure to no more than ten percent in any given country. This is a
very simple and obvious risk-spreading rule. Given that OPIC, in es-
sence, is betting on the political and economic stability of governments,
this risk-limiting role works well. In the case of political violence cover-
age, however, OPIC must look much more closely at conditions in the
host country, as well as conditions affecting the project itself.
For example, if OPIC were asked to insure an oil pipeline, its staff
would begin by examining the country in which the pipeline was to be
built. More specifically, OPIC would look at the region of the country,
the level of political violence that had taken place there historically, and
the potential for friction among various political, religious, and socio-
economic groups. It would look to such variables as the existence in the
area of active guerrilla groups, the government's ability to control vio-
lence, and the level of police or military presence. OPIC might also ex-
amine the topography around the project to determine whether troop
movements or guerrilla attacks would be relatively easy or relatively
42. The base rate for all countries is the same. Rates for a given project may vary some-
what based on OPIC's perception of the risk associated with the project. These variations are
relatively small-generally no more than 50% over the base rate. Of course, OPIC will decline
to insure a project that it believes is a bad risk, or will agree to insure it only on the condition
that the investor agrees to alter it to incorporate changes designed to manage perceived risks.
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more difficult to negotiate. OPIC would also study the characteristics of
the project itself. For example, would the pipeline be buried or built on
the surface and, if buried, how deep? OPIC would then consider the
pumping stations and assess the redundancy of capacity among the sta-
tions. In other words, if one station were damaged, OPIC would want to
know the economic effect on the project in terms of reduced oil flow.
Finally, OPIC would want to know what provisions the company had
made for repair. It might well require as a condition of insurance that
the company maintain a spare parts inventory at a certain level, or even
maintain an entire pumping station in parts that could be transported
quickly by helicopter to replace a damaged station and avoid costly down
time.
In one situation, OPIC agreed to assist a project involving a transpa-
cific fiber optic communications cable to the Philippines, as well as other
islands, several months before the fall of the Marcos regime, a time when
investors were not flocking to the Philippines. Despite well-publicized
political unrest in the Philippines, OPIC accepted exposure because the
circumstances of the project appeared to make it an acceptable risk.
Most of this investment would rest on the ocean floor, where it would not
be vulnerable to the usual dangers of political violence. Onshore facilities
would be limited to a few microwave relay towers, which are relatively
inexpensiveand can be easily replaced. Moreover, the financial structure
of the project was such that the income from the facility would be paid
into accounts in the United States, and then the American corporate par-
ties would pay the Philippine companies. The fact that the dollars were
captured here made the entity a much less tempting target for expropria-
tion. Finally, it had been OPIC's experience that even new revolutionary
governments want to communicate with the outside world. While land-
based telecommunications facilities have been relatively high on the list
of potential candidates for nationalization, as with ITT in Chile, they
have not generally been high on the list of potential targets for political
violence. Thus, interference with operations through damage to the on-
shore facilities seemed unlikely. Fortunately for all, the peaceful change
of governments in the Philippines has significantly improved investors'
perceptions of the Philippines in the interim.
B. The Record: How OPIC's Programs Have Fared
OPIC began operations in 1971 with a very large exposure in Chile
inherited from AID. It also began with relatively few resources. Never-
theless, OPIC survived that initial period and, in the fifteen years since its
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doors have been open, has paid approximately $465 million in claims.43
In addition, it has repaid its original "seed" money to the Treasury ($106
million), and has accumulated reserves of slightly more than one billion
dollars to back its insurance and loan guaranty programs.' In the pro-
cess, OPIC has paid or settled approximately 220 claims."5 To date, in
the history of the program, only about twenty claims have been denied-
only about a dozen by OPIC.4 6 Of these, only six claims have been sub-
mitted to arbitration. The record thus establishes, first, that OPIC has
remained financially viable and, second, that it has done so while paying
more than ninety percent of its claims without dispute. This success can
be attributed in part to OPIC's underwriting and legal staff, and in part
to the unique advantages OPIC has as an insurance company.
First, it is important to note that OPIC is a United States Govern-
ment agency backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.
While the importance of this government guaranty is difficult to quantify,
there is no doubt that it is important. Equally important are OPIC's
salvage abilities. OPIC has had phenomenal success in recovering money
paid to claimants by arranging three-way settlements with investors and
host governments, by guaranteeing host government obligations, by pur-
suing subrogated rights against the government, and, as described
above, 7 by disposing of locally blocked currency. In this respect, OPIC
has some important advantages that private insurers do not enjoy.
By statute, OPIC may operate only in those countries with which it
has "suitable arrangements"-usually bilateral investment agreements. 8
These international executive agreements describe the terms in which
OPIC programs may operate in any country. They provide that OPIC
may be subrogated to the rights of its insurers when it pays their
claims.49 They also provide for international arbitration of investment
43. OPIC Report on Form A.II.A, (Sept. 30, 1986).
44. OPIC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 2.
45. Id.
46. The others were denied before OPIC's creation in 1971.
47. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
48. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (Supp. 1986) (OPIC Amendments Act of 1985).
49. OPIC Form Contract 234 KGT 12-85, § 8.02 provides for assignment to OPIC of the
insured's claims under the following conditions:
Assignment to OPIC. Within sixty days after OPIC notifies the Investor of the
amount of compensation OPIC will pay under expropriation or political violence
coverage, and prior to payment, the Investor shall transfer to OPIC all interests at-
tributable to the insured investment (§ 4.01) or funds (§ 4.02) as of the date the ex-
propriatory effect commences, including claims arising out of the expropriation, or
claims arising out of the loss due to political violence (§ 6.01). The Investor shall
transfer the interests and claims free and clear of, and shall agree to indemnify OPIC
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disputes in the event that OPIC and the host government are unable to
reach a negotiated settlement.5" While OPIC has never had to resort to
international arbitration under these agreements (the only international
arbitrations have been with Iran under the special arrangement setting
up the Iranian Claims Tribunal), there is no doubt that the availability of
against, claims, defenses, counterclaims, rights or setoff and other encumbrances (ex-
cept defenses relating to the expropriation).
In connection with an inconvertibility claim, immediately upon receipt of in-
structions from OPIC, the Investor shall deliver the local currency to OPIC by draft
subject to collection (or, at OPIC's option, in cash).
OPIC may decline all or any portion of the Investor's interests or claims; if so,
the Investor's right to compensation shall be affected only as provided in § 5.03.4(b).
Bilateral agreements with the host countries provide that OPIC has the right to be subro-
gated to the claims of the Insured in that country. These provisions generally are in the fol-
lowing form:
ARTICLE 3
(a) If the issuer makes payment to any party under Coverage, the Government
of (Name of Country) shall, subject to the provisions of Article 4 hereof, recognize
the transfer to the issuer of any currency, credits, assets, or investment on account of
which payment under such Coverage is made as well as the succession of the Issuer
to any right, title, claim, privilege, or cause of action existing, or which may arise, in
connection therewith.
(b) The Issuer shall assert no greater rights than those of the transferring party
under Coverage with respect to any interests transferred or succeeded to under this
Article. Nothing in this Agreement shall limit the right of the Government of the
United States of America to assert a claim under international law in its sovereign
capacity, as distinct from any rights it may have as Issuer.
(c) The issuance of Coverage outside of (Name of Country) with respect to a
project or activity in (Name of Country) shall not subject the Issuer to regulation
under the laws of (Name of Country) applicable to insurance or financial organiza-
tions.
(d) Funds introduced or acquired in (Name of Country) or withdrawn from
(Name of Country) by the Issuer shall be exempt from all taxes upon income, real
property or sales, from customs duties, and from any other similar taxes or levies in
(Name of Country).
ARTICLE 4
To the extent that the laws of (Name of Country) partially or wholly invalidate
or prohibit the acquisition from a party under Coverage of any interest in any prop-
erty within the territory of (Name of Country) by the Issuer, the Government of
(Name of Country) shall permit such party and the Issuer to make appropriate ar-
rangements pursuant to which such interests are transferred to an entity permitted to
own such interests under the laws of (Name of Country).
See also Hearings on S. 1983 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 282 (1961).
50. Bilateral agreements with host countries provide that:
If at the end of three months following the request for negotiations the two Govern-
ments have not resolved the dispute by agreement, the dispute, including the ques-
tion of whether such dispute presents a question of public international law, shall be
submitted, at the initiative of either Government, to an arbitral tribunal for resolu-
tion in accordance with Article 6(b).
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international arbitration has been a factor encouraging negotiated
settlements.
Finally, the fact that OPIC is a Government agency may have been
helpful in at least two ways. First, some investors may seek OPIC insur-
ance in the hope that the aura of United States Government involvement
may assist them in dealing with a host country government. Second, that
same aura of Government involvement may serve, in some cases, as a
disincentive to a host country interfering with the investment. Again, it
is difficult to know precisely how important these factors have been in
contributing to OPIC's success, but they are important. -
In addition to these factors, OPIC's growth and success has been
aided by the LDCs themselves, which have begun to seek foreign invest-
ment as a source of capital for development. Whereas OPIC operated in
relatively few countries back in the early 1970s, it now has active pro-
grams in over 100 countries. 1 The increase in the number of countries
served by OPIC is a testament to the increasing interest by developing
countries in attracting United States investment. For example, in 1980
OPIC and China signed an agreement permitting OPIC to operate there.
OPIC assisted the first United States investors in China in late 1982 and
early 1983. In less than four years, OPIC has already assisted twenty-
four projects in China, and many more are on the way. 2 Latin America,
an area strategically vital to the United States, espoused, until recently, a
strong anti-investment ideology. Resentment about past colonial abuses
and fervent nationalism had produced a climate hostile to foreign invest-
ment. This climate was embodied in the investment codes of these coun-
tries, particularly in those of the members of the Andean Pact.5 3 In the
past few years, however, OPIC has signed new agreements with Uruguay
(1982), Chile (1983), Ecuador (1984), Colombia (1985), and Bolivia and
Argentina (1986). OPIC is currently discussing potential agreements
with Venezuela, Mexico, and others.
Another very significant shift has taken place in India, where the
hostile investment climate of the 1960s and 1970s began to warm to for-
51. OPIC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 6.
52. See generally Shanks, Investment Protection in China-Overseas Private Investment
Corporation Political Risk Insurance, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA
457 (E. Theroux ed. 1985).
53. Constitutional or statutory provisions in Latin American countries sometimes
bar ownership of real property by United States entities. Similarly, the Calvo doc-
trine is considered by many such Countries to inhibit them from recognizing U.S.
subrogation to claims, or agreement to negotiate and arbitrate such claims.
Hearings on S. 1983 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
282 (1961).
[Vol. 9
Insuring Investments and Loans
eign investors in the closing days of Indira Gandhi's leadership. Under
Rajiv Gandhi, this change has accelerated dramatically.54 Although In-
dia still has a strong, centrally-managed economy, the hostility toward
foreign investment is gone, at least from the bureaucracy's upper levels.
Perhaps more importantly, India has recently deregulated twenty-five in-
dustries and now encourages foreign investment in a number of economic
sectors." The significance of this change is understandable only when
one recognizes that, until recently, every Indian industry was burdened
with regulations which controlled entry, licensing, changes in produc-
tion, expansions, marketing, distribution, and virtually every other facet
of doing business.5 6 Now India has done away with many of these cum-
bersome restrictions and protectionist practices. Indeed, the government
now permits one hundred percent foreign ownership in certain sectors
and is attempting to move toward a more market-oriented system.57
III. LOOKING AHEAD
One would think that a program that assists United States investors,
encourages exports, helps development in the world's poorest countries,
and makes money-all at no cost to the American taxpayer-would have
no trouble being reauthorized by Congress. Unfortunately, this has not
always been the case. In past reauthorizations, OPIC has been burdened
with various requirements that affect its ability to operate in a business-
like manner. The most recent reauthorization was no exception. While a
detailed discussion of the 1985 OPIC Amendments Act 8 is beyond the
scope of this Article, a brief discussion of those changes is in order.
In recent reauthorizations, including the one just completed, organ-
ized labor has consistently opposed OPIC, arguing that OPIC aids and
abets the export of jobs. There is no evidence, and none has ever been
presented, that OPIC has ever supported any projects involving "run-
away" plants, or that any OPIC project has resulted in a loss of jobs in
the United States.59 Unfortunately, it is easy for OPIC's critics to charge
54. See Springboard for Growth, Financial Times (London), June 3, 1985, § III, at 1; IN-
DIA INTERNATIONAL INC., PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON SEMINAR ON UNITED
STATES-INDIA BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES: FUTURE DIRECTIONS (Apr. 18-19, 1985).
55. See News on Investment by Non-Resident Indians, INDO-AMERICAN BUSINESS TIMES,
Apr. 1985, at 29-30.
56. See PRICE-WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN INDIA (1980).
57. See India Enters into New Economic Era, INDO-AMERICAN BUSINESS TIMES, Apr.
1985, at 25.
58. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (Supp. 1986) (OPIC
Amendments Act of 1985).
59. Responding to the same concerns, Senator Metzenbaum requested that the GAO con-
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that the agency has supported a plant in some developing country while
some plant in the same industry, but located in the United States, has
been shut down, thus attempting to demonstrate that OPIC has abetted
in the transfer of jobs overseas. Despite considerable effort, no instance
has yet been substantiated in which OPIC has assisted a "runaway"
plant. Nevertheless, the belief that OPIC must somehow aid in the ex-
port of jobs is easy, but incorrect. Economic data prove conclusively that
OPIC's activities result in a substantial increase in employment because
OPIC encourages the export from the United States of production in-
puts. Indeed, it has been estimated that one-third of all United States
exports are associated with United States investments overseas. 60 Unfor-
tunately, these statistics are subtle and difficult to explain, especially to
busy politicians, who may have political incentives not to be persuaded
by the data.
Intense lobbying by labor has been successful in adding several new
burdens and restrictions to the OPIC legislation. Specifically, Congress
has added a provision which prohibits OPIC from assisting investments
in countries which are not "taking steps to adopt and implement so-
called internationally recognized worker rights. ' 6 1 These rights include
the right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike. The provision
also prevents OPIC from dealing with countries which do not have laws
that prohibit child or forced labor, establish maximum hours and mini-
mum wages, and guarantee safe working conditions.
OPIC fully supports the spread of enlightened labor practices. In
duct an audit of OPIC's projects in so-called "sensitive industries" to determine their effect on
United States employment. CONG. REc. S15670 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1985). A similar GAO
study after the last reauthorization found no evidence of harm to United States employment.
Preliminary indications are that the current study also has failed to turn up a "runaway"
plant, despite considerable effort and expense. The House added yet another comprehensive
study. This study of all OPIC projects currently existing must be completed by OPIC by the
end of 1987. The legislation also required OPIC to report to Congress additional economic
information concerning the effects of its projects on United States employment. OPIC
Amendments Act of 1985 § 13(c)(1). OPIC has nothing to hide on this score and is very
proud of its record of creating jobs in the United States through promoting United States
exports, as well as in host countries. By OPIC's estimates, using the same methodology the
Commerce Department uses to forecast employment, OPIC has helped create approximately
27,000 person-years of employment in the United States over the past four years, approxi-
mately equal to the number of jobs created in host countries through United States exports to
OPIC assisted projects.
60. Review of Activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corp: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 40 (1980); OPIC, DEVELOPMENT REPORT 19
(1980); OPIC Amendments Act of 1977, Report, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 6, 12 (1977).
61. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act, 22 U.S.C. 2191a (a)(1) (Supp. 1986)
(OPIC Amendments Act of 1985).
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testimony before the House and Senate, however, OPIC questioned the
wisdom of conditioning development assistance upon a host govern-
ment's adoption of labor standards similar to our own.62 The wisdom of
this approach seemed especially questionable, since OPIC does not assist
or deal directly with host governments, but rather works with private
investors. Therefore, it was doubtful that a decision by OPIC not to sup-
port a project in a country which has not adopted "internationally recog-
nized worker rights" could compel the host government to implement
such rights. Indeed, the host government very likely would never even
learn that a project had not gone forward, nor the reason why OPIC had
refused to assist it. Arguably, the effect of the amendment more likely
would be to punish the American investor, rather than the host
government.
Fortunately, Congress softened the language of the amendment as
originally offered, adding the "taking steps" language and providing for a
presidential waiver.63 The colloquy surrounding the addition of this lan-
guage makes it clear that Congress intends the requirement to be applied
reasonably and flexibly, taking into account the level of development ex-
isting in the host country.64
In order to comply with this provision, the State Department has
added a new list of rights to those it already considers in its annual
"Human Rights Report." The first such report containing these rights
has recently been completed,65 and OPIC is now in the process of review-
ing it. An interagency process has been established for those countries
benefitted by the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),66 and OPIC
will abide by the interagency group's determination with respect to any
country. For non-GSP countries, OPIC will make its own determination
in consultation with Congress and relevant Executive Branch agencies.
62. Reauthorization of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 253-55 (1985) (statement of Craig A. Nalen, President and Chief
Executive Officer, OPIC).
63. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2191a (a)(1) (Supp. 1986)
(OPIC Amendments Act of 1985).
64. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 279 (1985).
65. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985, Report Submitted to the Com-
mittee on Foregn Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States Senate by the Department of State, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
66. The GSP permits certain less-developed countries to receive more favorable tariff
treatment. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4). This favorable treatment will be
suspended for countries which the interagency group determines are not taking steps to imple-
ment internationally-recognized worker rights.
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A second major area of concern in Congress was the environmental
impact of investments supported by OPIC. While OPIC did not insure
or otherwise assist Union Carbide's investment in Bhopal, in the wake of
that tragedy OPIC had taken the initiative to revise and update its envi-
ronmental policies. Nevertheless, Congress added an environmental pro-
vision to the OPIC statute which essentially incorporated much of
OPIC's current evaluation practice and added a notification provision to
host country governments for environmentally sensitive projects.67
OPIC does not anticipate that the notification requirement will have a
substantial adverse business impact on its operations.
The Administration's Fiscal Year 1987 Budget proposed that OPIC
be "privatized" by the end of 1988.68 OPIC's management has been
working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other
relevant agencies to develop a plan to privatize OPIC, and has retained
an investment bank and other expert services. Congress has previously
considered privatization for OPIC. A serious attempt followed OPIC's
1974 reauthorization,69 but was abandoned in the 1978 reauthorization
because the private sector was unwilling or unable to provide the kinds of
service that OPIC provides.70
The Reagan Administration has emphasized the importance of pri-
67. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (Supp. 1985) (OPIC
Amendments Act of 1985).
68. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES Gov-
ERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1987, 3-13, 5-21 (1986). See generally the Reagan Budget: Rationale
for Dropping Programs: Key Programs to Be Eliminated and the Reasons for Doing So, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 1986, § B, at 14, col. 1; The President's Spending Cuts, Washington Post, Feb. 13,
1986, § I (Editorial), at E2; Budget's Impact on Banks, AM. BANKER, Feb. 10, 1986, News
Monday section, at 13.
69. See OPIC Conference Reports, H.R. Rep. No. 1233, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
70. Both the Senate and the House recommended repeal of the privatization mandate
contained in the OPIC's 1974 legislation. The House report concluded:
It is not clearly in the realm of possibility for the private sector to take over the entire
range of OPIC's programs. The private insurance companies have refused to partici-
pate at all in OPIC's war risks and have been reluctant to become heavily involved in
inconvertibility risks. And although private insurers have been more willing to share
the risk of expropriation, they say they want continued OPIC participation, in expro-
priation risks of at least 15-25 percent and continued OPIC reinsurance for cata-
strophic loss. The private insurers also want OPIC to continue to manage the
portfolio, particularly because of its experience and expertise in investment disputes
settlement. Furthermore, they are unwilling to make long-term insurance
commitments.
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPO-
RATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1977 H.R. Rep. No. 670, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1977).
The Senate Committee based its conclusions on:
1) private insurers' reluctance to commit significantly to a war insurance venture
that was not based on actuarial principles; 2) their relative lack of familiarity with
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vate sector investment in the development process.71 The Baker Initia-
tive, announced at the 1985 meeting of the World Bank in Seoul, Korea,
outlined a development strategy emphasizing the importance of encour-
aging increased foreign direct investment in lieu of additional debt.72 In-
vestment guarantees and political risk coverage of the kind offered by
OPIC have proven to be a relatively low cost and effective mechanism for
encouraging private sector investment in developing countries. It is for
this reason that the Administration supported United States participa-
tion in the new Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA), now
being set up under the auspices of the World Bank.73 OPIC has proven
to be an efficient development and foreign policy tool to enhance private
sector growth in developing countries. Whatever form OMB's proposed
privatization of OPIC may take, it is likely to confront a strong consen-
sus among the foreign policy and development community that the
United States should not sacrifice the foreign policy interests currently
served by OPIC, especially the encouragement of the United States pri-
vate investment in the LDCs. 74
political risk insurance; 3) their belief that OPIC has advantages as an underwriter
and claims salvager which private companies did not possess.
UNITED STATES SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVEST-
MENT CORPORATION AMENDMENTS AcT, S. Rep. No 505, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977).
71. See, e.g., J. William Middendorf II, Free Enterprise: Key to Latin American Economic
Revival, U.S. Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 692 (Feb. 22, 1985); Secretarty of State
George P. Schultz, Beyond the Debt Problem: The Path to Prosperity in Latin America, U.S.
Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 768 (Dec. 1, 1985).
72. Statement of the Honorable James A. Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury of the
United States before the Joint Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank at Seoul, Korea (October 8, 1985), reprinted in DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, TREAS-
URY NEws, B-302 (Oct. 8, 1985).
73. The MIGA is designed to encourage the flow of investment to and among devel-
oping countries by issuing guarantees against political risk, encouraging sound in-
vestment policies in member countries, and carrying out a wide range of promotional
activities. The United States has long bween an advocate of a greater role for foreign
direct investment in the development process. Foreign direct investment both en-
hances the private sector's role in development and ... encourages the flow of non-
debt capital to LCD's.
Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury, Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations 9 (May 20, 1986).
74. Since 1948, the United States has maintained a vehicle to encourage United States
private investment abroad. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9 for a discussion of OPIC's
predecessor agencies and programs.
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